Here is an interesting (and long) blog entry discussing the attack on the USS Liberty in 1967. (Aqoul is a great blog in general.)
Defining a state …
Avraham Burg, former Knesset speaker and former head of the Jewish Agency says “to define the State of Israel as a Jewish state is the key to its end. A Jewish state is explosive. It’s dynamite.” In an interview in Haaretz Weekend Magazine, he said that he is in favor of abrogating the Law of Return and calls on everyone who can to obtain a foreign passport.
(Thanks Hassan)
I would also add that defining Lebanon in terms of a confessional state is also (one of) the key(s) to its end. But as to whether the major players care depends on the losses or gains that will come their way.
Do You See What I See …?
Take a real close look at these pictures. What seems wrong or incongruent? Very serious, here.
Definitive Proof of Fatah al-Islam’s Connection to the Evil Empire …
Yankees Go Home!!! What more proof could anyone need?!? Everybody knows Bashar al-Assad still hates Bucky Dent, so please stop with the Damascene conspiracy theories.
In the more serious political world of calling balls and strikes, let me say that this is additional proof that Fatah al-Islam are not hard-core jihadis, but rather pay-a-day foot soldiers of a very local — and idiotic — concern. That a Lebanese version be rather awkward in its branding makes sense in the land of “adi-b-as” bags.* Hence the odd charm, non?
I would imagine that most groups or individuals that the USG, the media and others identify as Al-Qaeda are much the same. Just mercenaries, and like soldiers of fortune past and present they dabble in (or are dabbled in) the cultish arts for institutional and/or political purposes.
In other words, give me $5,000 and I will find you a man ready to die for the Easter Bunny.
* Thanks, prince of zion.
Turks enter Iraq
That is it, the moment that has been feared for quite some time finally happened, Turkish troops entered Kurdish Iraq yesterday to tame guerrillas ardor. This adds a new variable to the already explosive situation in the Middle East. Overlapping contradictory political agendas are multiplying. How will the US deal with this while preserving Turkey as a strategic ally? What is going to happen to Turkish-Israeli relations especially that it is Israel that has been training these Kurdish troops.
Morning thought …
Sometimes, when I go around my morning blog tour, I feel like I live in a parallel universe (or that they do – but that’s all relative) …
I wonder. Am I the only one who feels that way?
Here Come the Americans: Are Heifers in the Hold …?
SUBJECT: Partial Resumption of Travel to Lebanon to Promote Peace and Security
By virtue of the authority vested in me by 49 U.S.C. 40106(b) and for the purpose of promoting peace and security in Lebanon, I hereby determine that the prohibition of transportation services to Lebanon established by Presidential Determination 85-14 of July 1, 1985, as amended by Presidential Determination 92-41 of August 17, 1992, and Presidential Determination 98-32 of June 19, 1998, is hereby further amended to permit U.S. air carriers under contract to the United States Government to engage in foreign air transportation to and from Lebanon of passengers, including U.S. and non-U.S. citizens, and their accompanying baggage; of goods for humanitarian purposes; and of any other cargo or materiel.
All other prohibitions set forth in the above-referenced Presidential determinations remain in effect.
You are directed to implement this determination immediately.
You are authorized and directed to publish this determination in the Federal Register.GEORGE W. BUSH
I know, I know. You were thinking there are already enough CIA guys poking around in Lebanon. What’s a plane load or two more? Surely, I jest. Really, for now, I think this is just about getting more American cows into Lebanon, if you know what I mean.
More seriously, this is yet another symbolic act, a kind of psy-op for the policy wonks to tell their wives about. It seems to me there is a very serious fight going on in Washington over the direction of US policy in the region — you get a bit of this from the more insane rantings from the two sides’ reactions to the Scooter Libby sentencing. Yet at the current moment, there seems to be an eerie confluence around Lebanon policy. The Foggiest of Bottoms and the CIA likely believes they can simply wear out Hizbullah politically with financial and military aid (and they are probably right), while the OVP may still prefer to send Lebanon’s cannibals after them with newly-sharpened knives. The domestically-battered OVP is likely in the position to cede some ground here, as the State plan serves their needs of putting Hizbullah on the defensive as a potential first step toward more aggressive action. Similarly, State likely sees diplomatic value in media reports of the OVP’s irrational belligerence. Guessing how this will play out is impossible as it will depend on who wins the bigger battle over Iran policy. That being said, both sides are likely to see value in keeping up the pressure.
If these moves and others are successful in weakening Hizbullah politically, it will likely draw Hizbullah closer to Syria and here the Americans have the sordid boon of perhaps their most precious asset in Lebanon: anti-Syrian venom (enter some elements of M14, stage right). This will be exceedingly difficult for Hizbullah, as its efforts to balance support from Syria with the needs of its domestic allies and foes will just get harder to manage.
If the Americans are smart — and some of them are, these pys-ops will also include some tentative attempts at more kinetic action. This, of course, is where things get scary, as even small flames in a small village like Lebanon can quickly lead to all the houses burning down. Neither the Americans, nor the Israelis are ready to send Lebanon into the abyss just yet, so this will likely involve one-off attempts to keep the anti-Syrians barking and Hizbullah mentally busy, with the side hope of gathering some intelligence about Hizbullah’s intelligence gathering machine in the LAF, at the points of entry, and with UNIFIL — something both the Israelis and the Americans seemed to utterly lack during last summer’s war on Lebanon.
I said last summer that resisting the Israeli militarily would be child’s play for Hizbullah when compared to what would come next if they held off the IDF. I think that is probably true and that we are going to soon see just how smart and how patient Hizbullah really is. The squeeze cometh … Stay tuned.
On the Move …
Shadid is back …
While some analysts see the military’s battle against the militants as a way to forge a stronger state, others worry about the prospect of its failure. The threat of civil war still looms large over this always fractious country, but the violence and paralysis may suggest a broader breakdown: not civil war, but entropy, where the country becomes hopelessly mired in instability.
Ask a "Shiite"?
I don’t know if I should laugh or cry, but this blog or whatever you want to call it, has thought it would be useful for an alleged ‘dialogue of civilization’ to “Ask a Shiite” in such an ingenious fashion:
Our resident expert will be fielding questions of a philosophical, physical, and political nature in regards to Shiite Islamic belief and Middle East perception from his own eyes.
Notice the ‘rank’ of the ‘resident’. And notice that a lot of weight is put on “perception from his own eyes”. Did they mean to talk about his eyes encapsulated in a reified conceptualization of a uniformed and monolithic bunch of Shiites?
The loveliest part of it all, is that these forum of discussion are genuinely believed to engage ‘dialogue’ when in fact they serve to crystallize at a much deeper level a rigid perception of “the other”. “Lodge” it in your head: Nobody thinks according to a cohesive system of thought that a dilettante ‘thinker’ has written in a paper or book or what have you. There is not such a thing as a Shiite. Only you, me, political dominant players whether Shiite-named or not, are those who conceptualize an alleged “Shiite Islamic belief”.
Things May Be Getting Nasty in Washington …
They need to be out run, embarrassed, exhausted, pushed out of the room, or crushed.
Unsustainable …
Global imbalances were projected to stabilize in 2007 and 2008, but were still very large, he said. The United States deficit had increased to $860 billion at the end of 2006, and was expected to fall to $800 billion in 2007. That deficit was basically being financed by surpluses in the developing and oil exporting countries, as well as some major developed countries, in particular Japan and Germany. The European Union,at large, was projected to continue to have a slight deficit on its current account. United States debt, which had now deepened to well over $3 trillion, might turn out to be unsustainable in the rest of 2007 or next, putting further downward pressure on the United States dollar, he said. Since its peak in 2002, the dollar had depreciated vis-à-vis the major currencies by some 35 per cent and by 25 per cent against a broader range of other currencies.
With that increased debt the risk of a sharp depreciation of the dollar continued, he said. If countries willing to invest in United States dollar assets expected further depreciation, they might be less willing to hold dollar assets, triggering a much sharper fall in the United States dollar. The risk of disorderly adjustment and the steep fall of the dollar existed. The policy challenge was how to prevent a hard landing of the United States dollar and forge a benign adjustment of the global imbalance.
Decisions …
“The decision to wage this battle is heroic,” Aridi quoted Murr as saying during the meeting. “It is aimed at rescuing Lebanon and the Lebanese.”
So I guess there was a decision made. Not to nit-pick the words that one person quoted another person as saying, but as a decision analyst, I can’t help but wonder how that decision was made? What were the premises? What alternatives were considered? How did they evaluate all the possible outcomes? How did they assign risk? What information did they use? etc.
Just curious, is all …
…
The power of women
“If the army enters and tries to capture me, my wife asked me to martyr myself rather than surrender“.
Did Fatfat meet with Al Absi in Tripoli one week before the events?
Well, I will tell you a really nice story this morning. But first and although unconventional the morale of the story: Without ‘security officials’ leaks where would we be?
Mustaqbal sponsored Lebanese Minister of “Youth and Sports” Ahmad Fatfat, Fath al Islam leader Shaker Al Absi, and a bunch of other ‘high profile’ guys supposedly met in an apartment in the Abboud Center in Tripoli on the 5th of May 2007. This was leaked by a Lebanese security 3amid “Mahmoud al J…” to the Jordanian Al Watan newspaper.
This 3amid who still works with the Lebanese Interior Ministry assures that the meeting was organized by Jordanian officer Zaher Abr Abu Jandal (a Salafist and one of the ‘Al Dinyeh Islamists’ that were released by Saad Al Hariri along with LF leader Geagea) and who was killed by the Mustaqbal party militia-like structures (the Lebanese Internal Security Forces) one week ago as he was the only witness to the meeting and that ended up with a big disagreement.
Just to go back a bit, according to the security source, Fatfat was invited to a meeting in Washington in “the winter of 2006” in order to assess the potential use of Salafist movements in Lebanon. This meeting was allegedly held by Saudi, Jordanian, American, and Israeli intelligence, as well as the Lebanese 3amid Othman, and the Lieutenant Colonel Wissam al Hassan. It was decided during the meeting that Wissam al Hassan, Ahmad Fatfat, and the now-killed Jordanian officer (and who supposedly lived 10 meters away from the Abboud building in Tripoli, where the other meeting took place), to coordinate and prepare the ‘terrorists’ for when they could be useful.
The 3amid Mahmoud al J… insists on the fact that there is a very intimate relation between Fatfat and Salafist movements in Lebanon because of their concentration in the region of Al Diniyeh from where Fatfat is. The latter was supposed to coordinate and get closer to their leadership and try to win them to the Mustaqbal cause. Some Salafists are already aligned with Hariri according to the source, and these include: Sheikh Issam al Rifai, Al Islam Al Shahal, and Hassan al Shahal.
Now the moment we are all waiting for: What happened during the meeting? According to the source, Fath al Islam leader Al Absi was welcoming in his group recruits that somehow were not aligned with the Americans and so he was asked through Fatfat and Al Hassan to hand them in but he refused. So they stopped paying him the monthly sums given to him by bank transfer to an account in the name of Abu Jandal (the now-killed Jordanian) who was the medium between both parties and whose account was at the Mediterranean Bank in Amyun (you guessed it: it is the bank that was robbed by Fath al Islam, and needless to say that the Mediterranean Bank is held in partnership by Hariri).
An interesting revelation is that Baha’ Al Hariri (the brother of Saad today’s leader of the Mustaqbal party) is in a disagreement with his brother, as 3amid Mahmoud al J… is very close to Baha’, and that (and I keep the quote literally translated from Arabic): “Saad the American and Saniora the Israeli is something, and Baha’ the Hariri is something else”.
The 3amid insist that his story is true and invites the opposition groups to form a committee that would investigate on the matter and take fingerprints in this apartment in Tripoli.
For those who want the Arabic original version of the article can just ask me. and for those who know what is ‘3amid’ in English please do tell me.
Annahar and its sources
Today Annahar reported that after interrogating members of Fath al Islam, it seems they were preparing for a ’11th of sept’ style of attack on hotels in Beirut, and that they got arms from Syria. Basically, the perfect ‘terrorist’ group. I wonder is Annahar reporting what it wants to hear (as the ideological construct works on an unconscious level), or are the interrogators really extracting such informations? Who basically is interrogating FI? Because if the interrogators are the Lebanese army, I would doubt that they would reveal stuff like that, at the very least for diplomatic purposes.
Time for a round up
This post has been modified to include the precious insights of the commentators. First, I retract the ‘blame’ language that is quite useless it is true. Second, I try to focus on asking the questions we tend to think are the most relevant.
The recent wave of violence taking place in Lebanon has put into question several issues that I wish to address:
1- The legitimacy of the Lebanese army’s action
Posing the problem in the way it is posed through either nationalist from one side or leftist ‘humanist’ rhetoric from the other fails to address the problem. The Lebanese army was caught off guard whatever one may say. It would be much more judicious to wonder why the Lebanese army was put in this situation in the first place (if there is such a thing as a mover). And why, until now, no significant diplomatic moves have been recorded.
We need a much better understanding of what is going on inside the camps. How are political organizations structured? What are the various competing claims to power? What are the different security structures? And if there is a state of mild anarchy within the camps then to what extent other groups know what is going on but are keeping it to themselves? The way the PLO is behaving for example is just outrageous: It is sanctifying the Lebanese army’s deeds and hope that Fath al Islam can be wiped out the hard way. Where were they all this time? So busy brokering deals with the Americans that they forgot there are camps in Lebanon?
But above all, one needs to understand better how did Fath and even Hamas lost their grasp of political leverage inside the camps. Who are the non-Palestinian actors that played a role in this weakening if any?
Next, one needs to assess the various primary scenarios at hand: whether Fath al Islam before going wild was initially backed by the Lebanese Mustaqbal lead group (with or without US oversight), or whether Syria has supposedly sent Al Absi to play dirty tricks on the Lebanese (i.e. abiding by the “there is a Syrian behind every misdeed in Lebanon”). But in order to do so one needs to demystify Fath al Islam’s “ethos”.
2- The motives of Fath Al Islam (demystifying the ‘ethos’)
That is the trickiest question. What are Fath Al Islam trying to achieve? Are they fighting some ‘imperialist’ or ‘western’ or whatever discursively-defined enemy that poses real exploitative structures on them? Who? The Lebanese government? What was the Lebanese State doing against these people?
See, the problem with the pervasiveness of the ‘terrorist’ concept is that these dudes don’t even need to have a motive in order to create trouble, because it is thus thought under this conceptual framework that because they are ‘terrorist’ (labeled as such) there is something ‘within their being’ that is prone to violence, nothing more nothing less. It is the ideological pervasiveness in the belief of the ‘the essence behind the action’ that bluntly biases our understanding of this movement. We don’t look for motives because the motive is just their ‘being’! (i.e. being terrorist, which is an empty signifier).
So let’s look for some sense in this: We know that Al Absi before being arrested in Syria was planning to ‘liberate the Golan‘. Well ok, that may be a militant plan that I can buy. Then, what were they doing in Lebanon? Did post-Hariri (because as pointed out by Jean Aziz for example, Hariri himself was not playing the ‘Sunni fundamentalist’ card) people promised them something specific? What was their political agenda? Why acting today?
3- The impact on the Lebanese political groups
The most interesting aspect of all this is how government, the opposition and even somewhat neutral ‘bystanders’ in the presses, blogs etc. are just working the problem through the ethical dilemma they face: Should we back the Lebanese army? or should we voice our concerns against the Palestinian civilians? Should we accuse the US of fomenting trouble, and wanting to find a pretext in order to either send more aid or just build a military base?
The obvious thing is that both the ruling government and the opposition groups are trying to play on the ‘terrorist’ rhetoric the best way possible. Opposition blames the government of letting ‘extremists’ develop, so they criticize their security mess-ups. And the government is pressing on more rapprochement with the international community in order to corner Hizbullah and other ‘old-regime’ remnants.
4- And now I vent a little (a note on the side):
Today, I pity the Lebanese army that found itself engulfed in this bloody quest, that is refueling anti-Palestinian sentiments, not between the Lebanese army ranks that are mostly Shi’as and are the most pro-Palestinian constituency in Lebanon today, but between the miserable petite bourgeoisie as would call it Al Haqid that have nothing else to do than to say: “ah these Palestinians they don’t want to let the army restore order, then they just get what they deserve!”.
I pity the innocent individual soldiers in the army that are obliged to play the ‘nationalist’ game for no reasons but to kill or get killed. I pity the Palestinians who are blocked in this camp or have difficulty leaving. And I pity the Palestinians to be in a camp in the first place. So I blame Lebanese authorities to have kept Palestinians in such a marginalized state where playing with a rifle was (obviously) a more exciting prospect than sitting and praying for divine liberation. And today, I blame Palestinian groups that have no oversight on these armed men and who on top of it all are hiding behind a completely disarrayed and brainwashed Lebanese government (himself hiding behind Uncle Sam) in order to see stability restored in their shit hole.
For the record …
It said that it could not break down the deaths between militants and civilians but that the total number of people killed since fighting began on May 20 exceeded 100, including soldiers, militants and civilians.
Le mythe de la terreur
Personnellement je trouve que l’apparition soudaine de ce phénomène de Fath el Islam au Nord très bizarre, d’un cote c’est l’ennemi parfait. Physiquement on peut l’associer au barbare étranger, la presse insiste sur le caractère étranger de ce groupe, on parle de saoudiens, de pakistanais, qui n’envoient pas leur enfants a l’école!! Bref des véritables monstres qui agressent notre…brave armée… affaire à suivre.
On the diplomatic front
A lot of people in Lebanon are calling us (us the expatriates) to tell us that we should not come back to Lebanon for a bit as the situation may worsen. I try to calm them down as I know things can’t get any worse. I mean today, while the Lebanese army resumed the pounding of the Nahr al-Bared camp, Mustaqbal party leader Saad Hariri called president of parliament Nabih Berri to congratulate him for his daughter Mayssa getting engaged with Ayman Joum’a (some guy). And as you guessed, the conversation did not include one mention of the camp battles.
I know what you are going to say. But somehow I just feel at home when I hear these ‘politesse oblige’ stories, especially when the country is on the brink of collapse.
Syrian workers cleaning Lebanese mess
Syrian workers opening the road that goes through the St Georges hotel to Raoucheh, the road on which former PM Hariri was assassinated. This road stayed closed until now waiting for ‘the international tribunal’ to be put in motion. Don’t ask the logic of it. This is how we do in Lebanon.
The Beat goes on …
Zaki said that he did not find a single closed door during discussions with Lebanese officials, adding that Defense Minister Elias Murr has instructed the army that “he does not want a single innocent civilian casualty.” According to the Palestinian Red Crescent, 23 Palestinian civilians have been killed in the fighting.
Sonnet XVII: A Poetic Interlude
I do not love you as if you were salt-rose, or topaz,
or the arrow of carnations the fire shoots off.
I love you as certain dark things are to be loved,
in secret, between the shadow and the soul.
I love you as the plant that never blooms
but carries in itself the light of hidden flowers;
thanks to your love a certain solid fragrance,
risen from the earth, lives darkly in my body.
I love you without knowing how, or when, or from where.
I love you straightforwardly, without complexities or pride;
So I love you because I know no other way
than this: where I does not exist, nor you,
so close that your hand on my chest is my hand
so close that your eyes close as I fall asleep.
— Pablo Neruda
Ludes, past:
Billy Collins, 1.
Ounsi El Hage, 1.
Henri Michaux, 1, 2.
Marianne Moore, 1.
Pablo Neruda, 1.
Sharon Olds, 1.
Theodore Roethke, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
Dylan Thomas, 1.
Richard Wilbur, 1, 2, 3, 4.
Remarkz 